Introduction
In a recent evaluation of the existing literature on incentives and careers in organizations, Robert Gibbons (1996) invited empirical researchers to \provide evidence on a core set of questions before studying speci¯c issues of their own." Two of these questions ask whether \wage increases and promotions are more likely with higher performance evaluations" and whether \the e®ect of seniority on wages (is) independent of the presence of controls for performance evaluation." The justi¯cation for these questions comes from the fact that most of what we know on the relationship between supervisors' evaluations, seniority, promotions and wages comes from two quite in°uential but old papers by Medo® and Abraham (1980 and 1981 ; MA hereafter) whose results, albeit widely quoted and discussed, have almost never been replicated and veri¯ed with di®erent datasets.
The wide interest for the pioneering work of MA is motivated by the fact that their evidence is not only relevant for industrial psychologists willing to understand the nature and role of supervisors' evaluations. Perhaps more importantly, their evidence is aimed at o®ering a test of great interest for labor economists: a test of whether a positive e®ect of seniority on wages re°ects an increase in productivity due to¯rm-speci¯c human capital investment or not.
In MA's work the basis for this test is the assumption that job performance ratings made by immediate supervisors are valid indicators of the relative current productivity of workers. Under this assumption, if the e®ect of seniority on wages were due to productivity, it should disappear after controlling for supervisors' evaluations. Furthermore, if more seniority increases the probability of a higher ranking in the distribution of wages it should also increase the probability of a higher ranking in the distribution of job performance indicators. Their¯nding is instead that the e®ect of seniority on wages is essentially independent from the presence of controls for supervisors' evaluations and that while higher seniority pushes workers up in the distribution of wages within levels it does not increase the worker's ranking in the distribution of performance ratings. They therefore conclude that the human capital theory cannot explain the e®ect of seniority on wages and that this e®ect must have di®erent explanations.
The most prominent of the alternative explanations proposed in the literature is based on the idea that a positive correlation between seniority and wages is required by implicit employment contracts aimed at creating the proper incentives to exert e®ort, as for example suggested by Lazear (1979 and 1981) . A similar positive correlation may also be generated by contracts aimed at protecting risk averse workers from wage changes induced by°uctuations in perceived productivity, as in Harris and Holmstrom (1982) or by sorting mechanisms as in Jovanovic (1979) . match might be positively correlated with lower quit rates and higher productivity. Therefore, the observed positive correlation between seniority and wages would be spurious and driven by these unobserved confounding factors. Both these papers reach the conclusion that earnings in fact do not rise very much with seniority. More recently, Topel (1991) has challenged this conclusion arguing that the two papers who propose it use inappropriate methods and/or data. On the contrary, Altonji and Williams (1997) defend and con¯rm the conclusion on the basis of a careful re-examination of the entire evidence.
For some scholars, the empirical question of whether wages do actually increase with seniority remains still open, as recently stated by Felli and Harris (1996) . But, even if one were willing to accept the conservative estimates of Abraham and Farber (1987) , Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Altonjii and Williams (1997) , the true e®ect of seniority on wages would nevertheless be approximately equal to 11% per ten years.
!
Even if this e®ect is small, it is not insigni¯cant, and one would still like to know if it re°ects an increase in productivity or other causes. Furthermore, even if¯rm-speci¯c human capital investment were irrelevant and self selection of more productive workers in longer jobs were the explanation of the OLS crossectional estimates, controls for individual productivity should still be expected to reduce this e®ect. For these reasons, we believe that a replication and veri¯cation of the MA results using di®erent data is still useful and informative twenty years later.
To be more precise the goal of our paper in not only to check whether MA's results can be replicated, but also to improve and extend their testing procedure using alternative direct indicators of individual productivity. As already mentioned above, the validity of their conclusions is based on an assumption that has been widely criticized in the literature: namely that supervisors' evaluations are a good measure of individual productivity. In their papers, MA anticipate this criticism answering several possible objections and strenuously defending their assumption. But the possibility that supervisors' evaluations have little to do with individual productivity remains a potential weak point of their approach.
We think that nothing can be added to what has been already written and said in defense or against this assumption. What is instead needed is the use of other and direct measures of individual productivity in order to check whether the results obtained by MA with supervisors' evaluations continue to hold.
Our proposed additional measures of current relative productivity are indicators of absenteeism and reported misconduct episodes that can be constructed with the detailed and exhaustive information contained in our dataset. The justi¯cation for these measures is intuitive. Workers who are more often and for longer periods absent are less productive for the¯rm, whether or not their absenteeism is motivated by shirking or true bad health. Furthermore, inasmuch as the accumulation of¯rm speci¯c human capital has to take place on the job, absenteeism must reduce such accumulation. For misconduct episodes, a higher frequency and gravity of misbehaviour recorded by the personnel o±ce indicates lower productivity precisely from the point of view of what the personnel o±ce considers as harmful for the¯rm. Neither absenteeism nor misconduct episodes fully measure productivity, but they certainly represent two important components of this multidimensional concept. It seems, therefore, likely that they should be positively correlated to the employee's true current worth for the¯rm. Note also that being measures of individual productivity or e®ort they are largely independent from aggregate shocks a®ecting the¯rm. We therefore believe that they provide interesting measures of productivity on which to check the robustness of MA's conclusions.
Our results are unambiguous: all our performance indicators do not have any e®ect on the seniority-wage pro¯le and while tenure increases the worker's ranking in the distribution of wages, it actually reduces his/her ranking in the distribution of these performance indicators. Of course, the combination of ours and MA's results could still not disprove the possibility that the e®ect of seniority on wages re°ects higher productivity of more senior workers. Suppose that productivity were the sum of two uncorrelated components: for example, good conduct and knowledge. If only the second grew with seniority our measures of good conduct would still leave the e®ect of seniority on wages unchanged. This (untestable) assumption notwithstanding, we believe that our results cast strong doubts on the hypothesis that productivity is the factor behind the growth of wages with seniority.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the data; section 3 replicates on our Italian sample the testing procedure proposed by MA; section 4 extends the original procedure using our alternative indicators of performance. Section 5 discusses possible alternative interpretations of the evidence and the conclusions that can be drawn upon it.
Data and Productivity Measures
The¯rm studied in this paper is a large bank with branches in every province of the Italian territory. From the personnel department of this bank we received several¯les containing, for di®erent aspects of the employment relationship, information on all the relevant events characterizing the history of each employee of the bank. In particular the¯les contain information on: 1) employee's characteristics independent of time at the¯rm, like date and region of birth, education (level, type and grade) and previous working experience; 2) compensation levels and individual or collective wage increases and bonuses; 3) careers, promotions, job description and turnover between branches; 4) union membership and union leadership position; 5) family loads; 6) supervisors' evaluations; 7) reason and duration of absence and late arrival episodes; 8) merit, disciplinary measures and dismissals on disciplinary ground.
The information contained in these original¯les has been reorganized for the analysis into a panel data set with one observation per year for each worker on payroll in the month of November of each year between 1974 and 1994. " To make our results comparable with the cross-sectional evidence of MA we concentrate on the sample of workers observed in the last of these years; but to construct some of our alternative productivity measures we also use the retrospective information o®ered by the panel structure of the " See Ichino and Ichino (1997) for more details on this dataset. data. # For the same comparability, reason we limit the analysis to the male workforce.
A potentially disturbing but unavoidable di®erence with respect to the samples considered by MA is instead represented by the fact that we received information on supervisors' evaluations only for non-managerial workers, while MA data include also employees in managerial jobs. This di®erence may make the comparability between ours and MA's results less informative but it does not seem to be in anyway essential for the testing procedure or for the interpretation of our results.
Our¯nal sample contains data on 10817 male employees on payroll during the month of November of 1994. Descriptive statistics on this sample are given in table 1. This table reports the descriptive statistics for the Company A sample described by MA. In their papers, they use data taken from three companies (A, B and C) obtaining similar results for each of them. In our paper, we decided to report, for comparison purposes, the results concerning company A because this is the company with the number of observations and the supervisors' evaluation system more similar to those of our bank. Only in the case of the auxiliary evidence presented in tables 3 and 4 we compare our bank with MA's Company B because MA do not present that type of evidence for their Company A.
Both our and MA earnings are measured before taxes but at the annual frequency in the MA¯rm and at the monthly frequency in our¯rm. As in the MA's paper, we measure education with the highest school degree attained by the worker.
$ For workers in both¯rms, pre-company experience was calculated as the di®erence between potential working experience (computed on the basis of age and educational attainment) and seniority. Current seniority is based on the precise date in which workers took service in the¯rms.
Hierarchical levels for our bank were constructed following the methodology described in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) . The idea of this procedure is to identify the relevant levels in the¯rm's hierarchy by looking at the actual paths followed with greatest frequency by workers in their careers. Beginning with the¯rst level, de¯ned as the set of positions in which workers are more frequently hired (the port of entry), higher levels are sequentially identi¯ed as those positions through which workers more frequently transit in a typical career. The result has been a scale of 8 grade levels for the non-managerial employees on which this paper is focused. The distribution of workers across these levels is given in table 1. Finally, table 1 describes also the regional distribution of workers in our sample.
The supervisors' evaluations system at our bank is very similar to the system that characterizes MA's¯rm A. Supervisors receive detailed instructions on how to rank their subordinates using a four-level scale. These instructions are analogous to those described by MA and involve four possible choices labelled as low, medium, good and very good. Table 2 shows for Italy a strong concentration of employees in the higher evaluation ranks: only 2.4% of the Italian workforce is classi¯ed in the lowest performance group, # Anyway, in our dataset, supervisors' evaluations are unfortunately available only for the period 1989-94. There is no evidence that the year 1994 is di®erent from the previous years of this short period from the point of view of the issues discussed in this paper.
$ Post-Laurea (post-college) degrees have been introduced very recently in the Italian education system and are irrevant in the sample considered in this paper.
while almost half of it is in the highest. Evaluation ratings are, however, more evenly distributed than in MA's company, where 74% of the workforce is concentrated in the third level. These are typical characteristic of subjective evaluation systems and have been used in the literature to argue that they cannot o®er reliable measures of relative productivity because the lumping in the top category hides relevant productivity di®erentials. Evaluations have also been criticized as measures of productivity because supervisors are unlikely to follow uniform criteria and because irrelevant worker's characteristics might instead in°uence the criteria of supervisors.
If these problems exist they are certainly shared also by the system of supervisors' evaluations in use at our bank, although in this¯rm the more even distribution of ratings makes them somewhat less worrisome. We have nothing to add to the defense proposed by MA in their papers % , but we believe that the most important contribution of MA does not live or die with the reliability of supervisors' evaluations as measures of productivity. The crucial value added of their paper consists in the identi¯cation of a procedure to test whether the e®ect of seniority on wages re°ects higher productivity of more senior workers. This procedure, originally applied using supervisors' evaluations as measures of productivity, needs now to be applied using di®erent and more direct measures. Therefore, since our data o®er this possibility, our goal is not only to show that MA's conclusions can be replicated in our¯rm but also and more importantly to show that they are robust with respect to other productivity indicators.
We construct these alternative indicators from the detailed information that our data set contains on the episodes of employee's absenteeism and misbehaviour recorded by the Personnel O±ce of our bank. As far as absenteeism is concerned, the variables that we use are constructed on the basis of the number of absence episodes per year of tenure that were due to illness and that lasted for more than 15 days. & Worker's misbehavior is instead measured on the basis of the number of episodes recorded and punished by the personnel o±ce according to the procedure established by collective bargaining and by the Statuto dei Lavoratori. ' These episodes involve unjusti¯ed absence and late arrivals, actions taken by the worker outside the relationship with the bank, but potentially relevant for the latter (e.g. fraud, theft etc.), violations of the internal regulations of the bank (e.g. omitted controls on checks, credit to unreliable customers, etc.) and inappropriate behaviour inside the workplace (e.g. sexual harassment, violence, insults, etc.). Possible punishments are chosen from a grid of sanctions established in collective bargaining that go from verbal reproaches to¯ring. Descriptive statistics concerning our additional performance indicators based on absenteeism and misconduct episodes are contained in table 2 To anticipate possible critiques concerning the irrelevance of supervisors' evaluations as productivity indicators, MA show that these evaluations are important predictors of the probability that a worker is promoted and of the size of wage increases. In table 3 and 4 we show that the same happens in our Italian bank. In both tables, column 1 % See also Bishop (1987) .
& Shorter absence episodes are not recorded by the Personnel O±ce. We tried also the average duration of episodes but it did not prove relevant. Also shows that the action in terms of absenteeism comes more from the frequency of episodes than from their duration. A careful examination of absenteeism in this¯rm is on our future research agenda.
' The Statuto dei Lavoratori is the chart of workers' rights that regulates the most crucial aspects of Italian industrial relations.
report the MA's estimates while columns 2 reports the analogous estimates for our¯rm. In both¯rms, and in particular in the Italian one, controlling for individual characteristics and hierarchical levels, employees receiving better evaluations are more likely to be promoted and receive higher percentage wage increases. The probability of promotion is estimated using a Logit model while an OLS regression is used to predict percentage wage increases.
In columns 3 and 4 of the same tables we show that also our alternative indicators of productivity, based on absenteeism and misbehaviour, are important predictors of promotions (table 3) and wage increases (table 4) . Controlling for individual characteristics and hierarchical levels, employees who are less frequently involved in absence or misconduct episodes are more likely to be promoted and receive larger percent wage increases.
Note that for supervisors' evaluations one could argue that in these regressions causality goes in the opposite way in the sense that better evaluations are granted to justify promotions and wage increases that are previously decided on di®erent grounds. In this case, higher evaluations would just be the bureaucratic consequence of the decision to promote or to give a wage increase. It seems instead di±cult to claim that the same reverse link of causation occurs for our alternative indicators of productivity. Therefore, extending MA's procedure on the basis of measures of absenteeism or misbehaviour seems important for this reason as well. But before presenting the results of this extension, we want to show, in the next section, that MA's evidence based on supervisors' evaluations is replicated in our¯rm.
3 Replication: The E®ect of Supervisor's Evaluations MA's empirical analysis is based on two distinct steps. The¯rst one consists in the estimation of ln(earning) functions with or without controls for supervisors' evaluations. In these regressions they¯nd that the coe±cient of seniority remains the same independently of the presence or absence of these controls. The second step is based on a multinomial logit analysis aimed at establishing if workers who rank higher in the distribution of earnings because of seniority, have also, for the same reason, a higher ranking in the distribution of performance evaluations. In this analysis they¯nd that while higher seniority pushes workers up in the distribution of earnings it tends to lower their position in the distribution of evaluations. In this section we replicate these two steps to check whether MA's results are con¯rmed in our¯rm. Table 5 reports comparable estimates of ln(pre-tax earning) functions based on our¯rm and on MA's Company A. The models in columns 1 and 4 are based on the standard
Earning Functions
As already mentioned, for comparison porposes we report here the results for MA's Company A because its evaluation system is more similar to the one in use at our bank.
human capital speci¯cation of these regressions. The¯rst set of regressors are dummies for schooling levels. Until very recently, the Italian education system did not o®er master and doctorate degrees and, therefore, dummies for these degrees are not available in the Italian sample. The comparison concerning the other educational coe±cients shows that, holding labor market experience constant, returns to education are substantially lower in Italy. With respect to college degree holders (the omitted category in both samples), Italian employees experience an income loss of 18% if they have less than a highschool diploma, while similarly educated US workers lose 25%. Holding just the highschool diploma implies a loss of 5% in Italy and of 13% in the US.
The next set of regressors captures the e®ect of total labor market experience distinguishing between time potentially spent with previous employers and seniority in the current¯rm. Both these e®ects are captured by linear and quadratic terms. Potential previous experience has basically no e®ect on current wages in the Italian sample. Probably because of high¯ring costs in Italian large service¯rms , employees at our bank are usually hired very soon after leaving schools and careers take place within the¯rm as in the Internal Labor Market paradigm. ! In this way the¯rm can minimize the cost of having to keep on payroll workers that after hiring prove undesirable but too costly to¯re. As a result, seniority represents more than 80% of total labor market experience for more than 50% of the workforce. We therefore believe that, as far as labor market experience is concerned, the comparison between our's and MA's results is probably interesting and meaningful only for the e®ect of seniority.
As far as seniority is concerned, 10 years of company service increase wages more in the Italian¯rm than in the US¯rm but the e®ects are similar. At ten years of seniority, ten more years of seniority increase wages by approximately 19% in Italy and by approximately 14% in the U.S. " Therefore, in both¯rms more senior workers are observed to earn substantially higher wages and the question addressed by MA is whether this e®ect has to be attributed to productivity or to other reasons.
Since supervisors' evaluations can be interpreted as indicators of relative productivity only within hierarchical levels, MA's next step consists in estimating how much of the e®ects of education and experience remains holding hierarchical levels constant. Their results are presented in column 5 while the comparable Italian results are in column 2. In both countries most of the loss due to holding less than a highschool diploma instead of a college degree comes from assignment to levels with lower mean earnings. For highschool graduates, instead, the loss takes place within grade levels in Italy, but between grade levels in the US.
Coming to seniority, a signi¯cant and similar e®ect of company service remains in ! see Doeringer and Piore (1971) .
" Note that, following MA, these estimates are based on a quadratic speci¯cation of the e®ect of tenure on wages and therefore are not directly comparable with the linear estimates generally found in the literature that we report in footnote 3.
both countries also after controlling for hierarchical levels: 44% of the return from one additional year of seniority occurs within grade level in the MA¯rm while 47% is the analogous¯gure for our bank.
If this within-level e®ect of seniority on wages were due to higher productivity of more senior workers, the introduction of productivity indicators should eliminate or at least reduce it. However, columns 3 and 6 show that the introduction of dummies for supervisors' evaluations leave the coe±cients on seniority, as well as those on education, basically unchanged. MA interpret this result as evidence that \performance does not appear to be a mediating factor in the within-grade level positive relationship between either education or labor force experience and earnings".
Multinomial Logit Results
The second step of the MA's analysis is aimed at establishing whether seniority raises the employee's ranking not only in the distribution of wages but also in the distribution of performance evaluations. Following the MA's procedure, given the small fraction of workers who got the lowest rating, we¯rst grouped together the two bottom evaluation levels 1 and 2. In this way we obtained three evaluation categories re-labelled respectively as low, medium and high.
We then created a trivariate categorization of within-level wages (low, medium, high) in the following way. Consider for example the¯rst hierarchical level in which 10% of the workers receive a low evaluation, 50% receive a medium evaluation and 30% a high evaluation. Given these quantiles, we classi¯ed in the low wage category those workers in level 1 who were in the bottom 10% of their within-level wage distribution; in the high wage category those who were in the top 30% and in the medium wage category those who were in the intermediate 50% group. We then repeated the same procedure for each of the 8 hierarchical levels. In this way we obtained a trivariate classi¯cation for both performance and wages and each worker was assigned to a wage and to a performance category. If workers with higher wages have also higher performance evaluations, the two classi¯cations should match perfectly. Indeed, the match is quite good although not perfect as shown by the fact that the correlation between the two classi¯cations is 0.37. But the crucial question that these two classi¯cations raise is whether the e®ect of seniority on assignments is the same in both. This question is relevant because if more senior workers were also more productive, higher seniority should increase not only the probability of an assignment to a higher wage category but also the probability of an assignment to a higher evaluation category. Table 6 reports, for the two¯rms, multinomial logit estimates of the probability of assignment to the evaluation and wage categories. Looking¯rst at the MA's results in columns 5, 6, 7, and 8, education, previous experience and seniority increase the probability of assignment to the two higher wage categories but reduce or leaves unchanged the probability of assignment to the two higher evaluation categories.
In the Italian¯rm, disregarding previous experience for the reasons outlined above, education and seniority have again di®erent e®ects on the employees' position in the two classi¯cations. Higher education increases the probability of assignment to the higher wage categories but reduces or leaves unchanged the probability of higher performance evaluations. As far as company service is concerned, the Italian¯rm does not feature opposite e®ects of seniority on wages and evaluations, but the coe±cients remains markedly di®erent in addition to being higher than in the US¯rm. Seniority increases signi¯cantly the probability of a higher ranking in the distribution of wages but much less, in relative terms, the probability of a higher ranking in the distribution of performance evaluations.
The fact that both the earning function and the multinomial logit analysis for our rm con¯rm MA's results, strengthen the conclusion that the e®ect of seniority on wages does not re°ect higher productivity of more senior workers. MA's result are not due to a peculiarity of their¯rm but can be replicated in a di®erent¯rm, in di®erent years and in a country characterized by very di®erent labor market institutions.
However, the evidence presented in this section for the Italian¯rm shares with the MA's evidence the critique concerning the use of supervisors' evaluation. Therefore, in the next section we adapt the testing procedure proposed by MA to alternative direct measures of workers individual productivity.
Extension: Absenteeism and Misbehaviour
The alternative productivity indicators on which our analysis is based are constructed in the way described in section 2 from the detailed information that our data set contains on the episodes of employee's absenteeism and misbehaviour recorded by the personnel o±ce of our bank. As in the previous section we examine¯rst the evidence based on earning functions. Then we move to the evidence based on the assignment to productivity and wage categories, that, given the characteristics of our productivity indicators, will take the form of a simple logit analysis. Table 7 reports the results of the estimation of earning functions. For the reader's convenience, the¯rst column reproduces the estimates of the basic human capital speci¯cation (augmented with hierarchical levels) presented in column 2 of table 5. Columns 2, 3 and 4 show how instead these estimates are modi¯ed by the introduction of our alternative productivity indicators, separately or together. In each speci¯cation the productivity measures are highly signi¯cant, but they leave the coe±cient of the education and experience variables practically unchanged.
Earning Functions with Alternative Productivity Measures
If anything, absenteeism appears to have a marginally greater negative e®ect on the seniority coe±cient, but the overall picture coming out of this table basically con¯rms the results of section 3.1: more senior workers do not seem to earn more because they are more productive, at least as far as absenteeism and misconduct episodes are measures of productivity.
Logit Analysis with Alternative Productivity Measures
In order to adapt the MA's multinomial logit analysis to our productivity indicators we proceed as follows. In the case of misconduct episodes, the high productivity category is de¯ned by the group of employees who were never reported for misconduct during their company service. Given the proportion of workers in this status for each hierarchical level, the same fraction of workers in the highest tail of the distribution of wages of each level was assigned to the high wage category. In the case of absenteeism we created a bivariate classi¯cation in which the high productivity category is de¯ned by the group of employees who were never sick and absent from work for more than 15 days. The corresponding high wage category is therefore constituted by those employees who were found in the highest correspondent percentile of the distribution of wages within each level.
As in section 3.2, if seniority increases the probability of an assignment to the high wage categories it should also increase the probability of an assignment to the high productivity categories de¯ned in terms of absenteeism and misconduct. If this were the evidence the hypothesis that the e®ect of seniority on wages re°ect productivity di®erences could not be rejected.
However, table 8 shows that the evidence goes in the opposite direction. While the marginal e®ect of seniority on the probability of an assignment to the high productivity category is negative, the analogous e®ect on the probability of an assignment to the high wage category is positive. And this happens with both the indicators based on absenteeism and misbehaviour.
One could argue that this evidence does not exclude that more senior workers are worth more to the¯rm and therefore are paid more. But shows that this is certainly not happening because more senior workers are less often absent or less often punished for misbehaviour. Quite the opposite, more senior workers appears to be on average more prone to absence and to misconduct episodes.
Discussion and Conclusions
The possibility to replicate MA's results twenty years later, in a di®erent¯rm and in a country characterized by di®erent labor market institutions is a¯nding that in our opinion reinforces MA's original conclusion that productivity is not the driving force of the observed upward sloping wage-seniority pro¯les.
However, the simple replication of their empirical analysis, based on supervisors' evaluations as indicators of productivity, su®ers of the same weakness of their approach: namely, that supervisors' evaluations might not measures in a satisfactory way individual relative productivity. A hopefully more interesting contribution of our work is to show that MA's results are robust to the use of alternative objective indicators of relative productivity.
Somewhat surprisingly, in their 1981 article Medo® and Abraham claim that \hard" and \objective" measures of productivity do not dominate \soft" and \subjective" performance ratings or rankings for two main reasons. First, because it is hard to¯nd objective measures that convincingly quantify \the true value of a worker to his or her rm". And second because \there would have to be only one dimension relevant for assessing the employee's true current worth or the researcher would have to know the proper set of weights or shadow prices to attach to each relevant dimension." However, in the same paper, they show that any performance indicator P which captures current productivity, albeit with some errors should reduce the value of the coe±cient of seniority in ln(earning) equations. \This is true even if the performance variable which is introduced captures current productivity with error, provided only that there is some information about productivity contained in the performance variable and that the error in the performance variable is uncorrelated with experience and ability". Of course the reduction of the coe±cient on seniority should be larger the smaller the error with which the performance indicator approximates the true productivity of the worker.
We believe that indicators of absenteeism and reported misconduct episodes satisfy precisely the requirements that a performance indicator needs in order to o®er a test of whether the observed e®ect of seniority on wages re°ects productivity di®erentials. Workers who are more often absent are evidently less productive for the¯rm, whether or not their absenteeism is motivated by shirking or true bad health. Furthermore, inasmuch as the accumulation of¯rm speci¯c human capital has to take place \on the job" absenteeism must reduce such accumulation. Similarly, for misconduct episodes, a higher frequency and gravity of misbehaviour recorded by the personnel o±ce clearly indicate lower productivity. These are precisely episodes in which the personnel o±ce considers the behaviour of an employee as harmful for the¯rm.
In contrast with MA's scarce faith in the usefulness of objective indicators of productivity, we think that a collage of evidence based on both subjective and objective measures, o®ers more convincing arguments against the idea that the e®ect of seniority on wages re°ects the higher productivity of more serious workers.
Nevertheless, this collage of evidence is certainly not enough to completely dismiss with con¯dence the hypothesis of a productivity driven wage-seniority pro¯le. This because productivity is a multidimensional concept that we do not know how to measure precisely. Suppose for example that productivity were the sum of two uncorrelated components: knowledge and good conduct. # Suppose also that knowledge grows with seniority while good conduct is independent of company service. Under these assumptions wages could grow with seniority because of the underlying unobservable increase in knowledge. Yet, proxies for good conduct like indicators of absenteeism and misconduct episodes would have no e®ect on the wage-seniority pro¯le. The evidence based on our alternative measures would not mean that productivity is irrelevant for the wage-seniority pro¯le. Note that the evidence based on supervisors' evaluations is probably more robust with respect to this problem since evaluations are likely to re°ect both knowledge and good conduct. Given the multidimensionality and unobservability of the concept of productivity, each proxy has advantages and disadvantages, and only a collage of di®erent indicators drawn from newer and better data can provide the¯nal answer.
# We would like to thank Robert Waldmann for attracting our attention on the implications of this hypothesis.
A related problem in the interpretation of our¯ndings is represented by the fact that there are di®erent ways in which productivity may be the driving force of upward sloping wage-seniority pro¯les in cross-sectional regressions. First of all, more senior workers may be more productive because they have invested more in¯rm speci¯c human capital. But, alternatively, they may be more productive simply because less productive workers (matches) are¯red (dissolved) after fewer years of company service. Since our and MA's evidence is based on cross sectional evidence it cannot say which of these two possibilities is rejected. The second hypothesis has been raised in the literature after MA's papers. $ Not surprisingly, therefore, MA interpret their evidence as evidence against the hypothesis of¯rm's speci¯c human capital investment, disregarding the second possibility. But we believe that twenty years later this second possibility cannot be simply disregarded. % This is an even more relevant issue given that the alternative indicators of performance on which this paper is based measure average individual e®ort along the entire career of a worker. Employees more prone to absenteeism or misconduct might be expected to be¯red or to be induced to quit earlier in their careers. This should induce a selection of workers in longer jobs such that seniority should appear to be associated with a lower number of absence and misconduct episodes per year of tenure. Yet we know from table 8 that this is not happening in our sample: higher seniority is associated with more absence and misconduct episodes.
We think that this¯nding is the consequence of the low turnover characterizing this¯rm (less than 4% per year) and in particular of the insigni¯cant number of¯ring or induced quits for disciplinary reasons (424 in 21 years and in a¯rm with employment levels ranging between 15000 and 19000). These numbers suggest that almost no selection of workers has taken place in this¯rm, and in particular no selection of better workers in longer jobs. This appears to be a¯rm in which most of the employment is for life because monopolistic rents due to government regulations are large and widely shared with workers, who therefore tend not to quit voluntarily. On the other side¯ring costs, particularly those due to the unavoidability of legal con°icts in case of¯ring & , are prohibitive and reduce turnover for disciplinary reasons.
Given this situation, even if in less regulated markets it were possible that upward sloping wage-seniority pro¯les were due to the selection of better workers in longer jobs, this is probably not happening in the case of this Italian¯rm simply because almost no selection takes place and jobs are for life. Therefore, the fact that our indicators of productivity do not change the wage-seniority pro¯le is more likely to be evidence against explanations in which greater productivity is a genuine driving force of this relationship. As suggested twenty years ago by Medo® and Abraham, alternative theories in which wages are deferred for incentive or insurance reasons are more likely to explain the observed evidence.
$ In particular, as already mentioned in the introduction, by Abraham and Farber (1987) and by Altonji and Shakotko (1987 
